Disinformation Tactics Identified in Hungary's Parliamentary Election

Domestic Disinformation Efforts Domestic actors deployed aggressive tactics compared to previous elections.

A research fellow at the European University Institute noted that pro-government groups manufactured news stories based on false information. For instance, Orbán’s party created a fake party platform for Tisza, which was leaked to a Hungarian news site. The news site published a story claiming Tisza planned a major tax hike if elected.

The forged document included policy proposals such as taxing cats and dogs. Tisza filed lawsuits against the news site and other media companies for publishing the story. Orbán’s party also used fake policy platforms on campaign posters across the country.

The research fellow stated that these actions went beyond propaganda by creating fabricated evidence to support narratives. Tisza countered by campaigning in villages to build support and strengthen its position.

Russian Interference Activities Russian interference was present but had limited reach.

An analyst with NewsGuard described the tactics as a standard approach for election meddling, including falsified news reports with claims against Orbán's opponents. One operation, Matryoshka, produced a fake video news report mimicking the French outlet Le Monde. The video claimed Ukrainian artist Denis Panshenko had been poisoning Hungarian dogs.

Another group, Storm-1516, published articles resembling legitimate news sites. One article stated that Orbán’s main opponent insulted US President Donald Trump, gaining traction on social media platform X. Storm-1516 also accused Tisza figures of involving Hungary in the Russia-Ukraine war and harming US-Hungarian relations.

The analyst suggested the increased activity stemmed from assumptions about Orbán's media control. However, the fact-checking organization found many Russian campaigns used English instead of Hungarian and focused on X, a platform less influential for Hungarian discourse than Facebook. The analyst reported that the reach of these Russian efforts was limited.

Researchers advised against overestimating their effect based on observed spread.

Social Media and Advertising Adaptations New restrictions from Meta and Google altered how political parties disseminated messages on platforms like Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube.

Meta banned political advertising in the European Union in October 2025 due to legal uncertainties. YouTube implemented similar prohibitions in September 2025 for ads that could influence elections or referendums. These measures reduced propaganda on social media compared to prior campaigns, according to the research fellow and a journalist with the fact-checking organization.

Fidesz adapted by creating private Facebook groups, including Fighters Club with over 61,000 members and Digital Civic Circles with more than 100,000 members. A translated description of the group indicated it was founded by Viktor Orbán in 2025 to represent Hungary's interests online. The group is invitation-only and targets Hungarians ready to act for specified values.

The journalist explained that these groups instructed supporters to engage with posts by liking, sharing, and commenting to increase visibility. The groups ran over 4,000 ads on Meta to attract members, as reported by Political Capital, a Hungarian NGO.

Other pages, such as Heart of Hungary, published paid ads with a fabricated article accusing a Tisza politician of recruiting Hungarians for the Ukraine war.

The fact-checking organization stated these ads reached at least 100,000 people in a week.

Use of AI in Campaigning Political Capital highlighted the use of AI videos on Facebook for campaigning.

A Fidesz candidate posted a war-themed AI video depicting Tisza party members taking young Hungarians to the front lines. Other Tisza members, including a politician, Tibor Ferenc Halmai, and Tamás Cseh, appeared in military uniforms in the video. Tisza members also used AI-generated images, such as TIME Magazine covers showing Peter Magyar and others as Person of the Year on Facebook.

Political Capital noted these efforts countered pro-government narratives. Such AI content is not tracked by tools like Meta Ad Library, complicating analysis of its spread, according to the research fellow. The election's disinformation landscape involved media outlets, proxy organizations like the National Resistance Movement and Megafon, and social media strategies.

These elements affected the campaign's dynamics, influencing voter perceptions ahead of the vote.