Israel Entered 2023 War With Weakened Domestic Weapons Production Capacity, State Comptroller Report Finds

The report found that Israel entered the multi-front war in 2023 with weakened domestic weapons-production capabilities, gaps in certain weapons stockpiles, and no full, budgeted policy for preserving domestic arms production lines. Over the past two decades, certain domestic production capabilities for raw materials used in weapons manufacturing were damaged or lost.

Some weapons production lines were weakened because of insufficient orders and a preference for cheaper procurement from abroad. The issue became more urgent after the outbreak of the war, the report said. As the IDF’s demand for weapons and components rose, several countries, including some described as friendly to Israel, imposed embargoes or restrictions on the supply of weapons, raw materials, spare parts, and components.

At the same time, global demand for such materials had already increased following the Russia-Ukraine war, further complicating procurement.

On the eve of the war, the IDF’s stock of certain weapons was below the procurement target set for the end of 2024. In another case, the target itself was lower than the operational need identified for that period. From December 2016 until the outbreak of the war, the Defense Ministry had not ordered certain weapons, except for one type ordered in June 2023 for delivery by the end of 2024.

Most orders for a certain type of weapon were placed only after the war began. The political echelon had not set a comprehensive, budgeted policy before the war for maintaining domestic weapons-production independence. Former defense ministers discussed parts of the issue but did not address the full range of capabilities required, set priorities, approve a full budgeted plan, or bring the matter before the National Security Council or the prime minister.

The security cabinet also did not hold a dedicated pre-war discussion on domestic weapons-production independence or on preparations to accelerate domestic production in an emergency.

Domestic production-capability mappings approved in 2021 and 2022 were carried out without the IDF’s participation. They also did not include a full review of the components, raw materials, and manufacturing technologies used to produce weapons in Israel.

As a result, the defense establishment lacked a full picture of whether certain weapons could be manufactured entirely in Israel, what it would cost to do so, and which capabilities should be prioritized. Before the war, the Defense Ministry had not prepared a structured plan for reducing risks created by reliance on foreign procurement.

Such a plan could have included mapping alternative suppliers, signing state-to-state supply agreements, or purchasing stocks of critical raw materials. The comptroller found that the lack of sufficient domestic production capacity and missing stocks of certain weapons and raw materials had operational significance during the war, including harm to the pace of certain IDF operations and risk to soldiers in specific circumstances.

The IDF said that its combat capabilities were not harmed and that soldiers’ lives were not endangered because of ammunition or weapons stocks. The military said it had been fighting continuously on multiple fronts for more than two years while achieving its operational objectives and that it had carried out numerous processes to address gaps and prepare for possible shortages.

The Defense Ministry said in response that domestic munitions production is at the core of its strategy and at the top of its priorities. Since the outbreak of the war, and particularly over the past year, it has worked to close years of gaps and is advancing a broad, multibillion-shekel plan to achieve domestic weapons-production independence.

The ministry said it has established new production infrastructure and expanded production lines in around 20 critical fields together with the defense industries. Emergency measures over the past year led to a production acceleration of hundreds of percentage points, including through management of critical raw materials, resolving bottlenecks, and training dedicated personnel in the defense industries.

The ministry is also advancing a plan to accelerate Israeli procurement and maximize domestic munitions production in critical components as part of the “Shield of Israel” force-building plan, approved by the prime minister and defense minister, at a scope of NIS 350 billion over a decade.

Englman recommended that the security cabinet examine the recommendations of the Nagel Committee on the defense budget and force-building, including those dealing with increasing domestic weapons-production independence, expanding production infrastructure, and strengthening technological superiority.

He also recommended that the Defense Ministry draw lessons from repeated findings on the erosion and loss of weapons production lines, monitor essential production lines together with defense industries, and include raw-material production lines in that oversight.

The report further recommended that the Defense Ministry, IDF chief of staff, and deputy chief of staff set a budget, funding sources, and action plan for purchasing stocks of raw materials, long-lead items, and discontinued or soon-to-be-discontinued components during routine times, so Israeli defense industries can accelerate weapons production during emergencies and wars.

Englman also called on the Defense Ministry, the IDF, and the NSC to regularly update the mapping of domestic production capabilities, set priorities, and establish budgets.